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F a i l u r et oa p p r e c i a t et h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h ef r e q u e n c yo fad i s o r d e ri nt h ea p p r o p r i a t ep o p u l a t i o n( t h eb a s er a t e )m a yl e a dt ot h e
misinterpretation of the diagnostic signiﬁcance of unexpected test results (unexpected test result deﬁned in this context as a test
result that is positive in a higher proportion of cases of an alternative diagnosis than in the diagnosisconsidered mostlikely before
the test). This study aimed to determine whether pathologists are vulnerable to this error. Pathologists were asked to estimate the
probability of tumour B in a scenario in which, prior to the immunostainingresult, an experienced pathologist considers there to
be a 99% chance that the patient has tumour A and a 1% chance that they have tumour B. Antibody X is positive in 80% of cases
of tumour B and negative in 90% of cases of tumour A and is positive in the case described in the scenario. The estimates made
by consultant pathologists ranged from 0 to 100% (mean 29.7%). The Bayesian answer would be 7.5%. These ﬁndings suggest
that base-rate error may lead some pathologists to overestimate the implications for the likelihood of a diagnosis in the light of an
unexpected immunohistochemicalresult.
1.Introduction
Base-rate error in medical diagnosis refers to the cognitive
bias in which doctors may underestimate the importance
of the frequency of the relevant disorder in the appropriate
population (the pretest probability) when considering the
implicationsforthediagnosis oftheresultoftestswhich have
less than 100% sensitivity and speciﬁcity. An underappre-
ciation of the importance of the base rate has been shown
outside medical practice, for example, in the interpretation
of fallible witness evidence [1], and has also been shown
in relation to the interpretation of diagnostic test results by
physicians [1–3].
In the ﬁeld of base-rate errors in diagnostic interpre-
tation, the most closely studied area thus far has been in
relation to mammography. Eddy has previously reported
base-rate error in the interpretation of the diagnostic con-
tribution of mammogram results by physicians [3]. In his
scenario, 79.2% of patients with breast cancer are assumed
to have a malignant result on mammography (sensitivity)
and 90.4% of patients without cancer to have a benign
mammogram result(speciﬁcity).Heaskedwhathedescribed
as“aninformal groupofapproximately100physicians” what
the probability of a patient having breast cancer would be if
they had a 1% risk of the disease prior to the mammogram
but had a malignant diagnosis on mammography. In this
scenario, the mathematically correct answer (by Bayesian
analysis) would by 7.7%. He reported that approximately
95% of physicians estimated the risk as approximately 75%
(almost 10 times the actual risk).
A similar study in which physicians were asked to predict
the probability of a malignant lesion in a patient with a
positive mammogram result demonstrated that even when
providing their own individual estimates for the sensitivity
and speciﬁcity of mammography in a breast mass scenario,
physicians consistentlyoverestimatedtheimpactofapositive
test result on the likelihood of the disease [4].
Pathologists are regularly formulating diﬀerential diag-
noses and using further investigations, particularly immuno-
histochemistry, toassist intheselectionoftheﬁnal diagnosis.
This process could be regarded as cognitively equivalent
to the processes involved in making a clinical diﬀerential
diagnosis of a breast mass, further investigating with mam-
mography, and then deciding whether to proceed to biopsy.
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if ever be 100% sensitive and speciﬁc in the diﬀerentiation
between two or more entities but may assist in making a
diagnosis more or less likely, in the context of the prior
probabilities of the diagnosis as assessed by the pathologist
on morphological grounds, in the context of the clinical
and radiological background data. This is not to suggest
that a pathologist in real-life practice would ever consciously
undertake a Bayesian analysis on the immunocytochemical
results of a test; however, I would argue that the possibility
that immunocytochemical testing might be subject to base-
rate-relatedcognitiveerrorissuﬃcientlyplausibletowarrant
investigation. If such an error were to be widespread, this
would suggest that pathologists might be at best at risk of
unnecessary expense in ordering investigations that mini-
mally aﬀect the probability of the diﬀerential diagnoses, and
at worst might lead to misdiagnosis and inappropriate treat-
ment. To the best of my knowledge the risk of base-rate error
speciﬁcally in relation to the use of immunohistochemistry
has not been previously investigated.
The study reported here used a scenario mathematically
similar to that used in Eddy’s mammography study [2],
however the content and context was altered to reﬂect the
practice of histopathology.
2.Materialsand Methods
A survey was conducted of cellular pathology consultants
and trainees in which the following scenario was presented:
“Pleasereadthefollowinghypotheticalscenario:
An experienced histopathologist after examin-
ing a haematoxylin and eosin stained slide and
taking into account the clinical and radiological
c o n t e x to ft h ep a t i e n tc o n s i d e r st h e r et ob ea
99% chance that the patient has tumour A and a
1% chance that they have tumour B These tum-
ours require diﬀerent treatment. Antibody X
has been shown to be positive in 80% of cases
of tumour B, and negative in 90% of cases of
tumour A. The pathologist is surprised to ﬁnd
that the lesion stains convincingly for antibody
X.Whatwouldyouestimate are thechances that
the patient has tumour B? (Please state estimat-
ed percentage)”.
By Bayesian analysis, the “correct” answer can be derived
from the following equation:
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In the above equation, P(B | pos) refers to the probability
that the patient has tumour B given the positive stain for
antibody X, P(pos | B) refers to the probability that if the
tumour is B then it will stain for antibody X (sensitivity),
P(B) refers to the prior probability that the patient has
tumour B, P (pos | A) refers to the probability that if the
tumour is A then it will stain for antibody X (false positive
rate),and P(A)referstothepriorprobabilitythat thepatient
has tumour A.
In the example of this scenario, the ﬁgures would be:
P(B | pos) = 0.8 × 0.01/((0.8 × 0.01) + (0.1 × 0.99)) =
0.075 (7.5%).
The intention of the study was not to see whether
the subjects could perform the calculation but to see how
closely their intuitive estimate matched the mathematical
calculation.
The questionwas part ofan anonymous survey related to
postgraduate pathology education, which had the National
Health Service research ethics committee and Royal Free
Hampstead NHS Trust Research and Development Depart-
ment approval. Four groups were surveyed—consultant
cellular pathologists (cellular pathologists here deﬁned as
histopathologists, cytopathologists, and neuropathologists),
trainee cellular pathologists, medical doctors (consultants
and trainees) who are not cellular pathologists, and medical
students (4th year medical students at the University College
London Medical School). All doctors surveyed were practic-
ing in the United Kingdom at the time of the study.
The survey was conducted predominantly online (with
invitationstoundertakethesurveyincludedwithin theemail
newsletter of the Royal College of Pathologists and also sent
by email to personal contacts in the UK). A minority of re-
sponses, predominantly those provided by medical students
before lectures and tutorials, were obtained in paper form,
and some of these forms distributed to medical students
were restricted to the question related to base-rate error.
As shown in Table 1, the numbers of responses were 82
(43), 38 (28), 23 (16), and 59 for consultant pathologists,
trainee pathologists, other doctors, and medical students,
respectively (with the numbers in parenthesis referring to
the number responding to the speciﬁc question in the survey
addressed in this paper). Many of the medical students were
only given the question on base-rate error; therefore, the
response rate for this question in the medical student group
cannot be assessed.
It is acknowledged that this method of sampling has lim-
itations, including potential sample bias and response bias,
and also that it is impossible to reliably assess the response
rate to the survey; however, according to the Royal College
of Pathologists workforce department, in 2007, there were
1448 consultant cellular pathologists and 555 trainees in the
United Kingdom (personal communication). Therefore, it
can be estimated that responses were obtained from approxi-
mately 3.0% of the consultant cellular pathologists and 5.4%
ofthetrainee pathologistspracticingin theUnitedKingdom.
3.Resultsand Discussion
All four groups showed remarkably similar overall results
(seeTable1andFigure1).Therewasanextremelywiderange
of individual estimates in all groups. Each group contained
individual responses giving estimates of the probability of
tumour B of under 1% (including one response of 0% by
a consultant cellular pathologist and responses of 0.08% by
trainee pathologistsand a medicalstudent).The upperrange
of the estimates was also very high in all groups, including
three responses of 99% and one of 100% in the consultantPathology Research International 3
Table 1: Summary of results.
Consultant
pathologists Trainee pathologists Other doctors Medical students
Number responding to survey 82 38 23 N/A
Number answering question 43 28 16 59
Median predicted probability of tumour B (%) 10 10 10 10
Mean predicted probability of tumour B (%) 29.7 28 28.8 32.3
Range (%) 0–100 0.008–99 1–90 0.08–90.1
Standard deviation 37.1 35.6 28 34.9
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Figure 1: Distribution of predicted probability of tumour B—consultant cellular pathologists.
cellular pathologist group and up to 99% in the trainee
group.
There were nostatistically signiﬁcant diﬀerencesbetween
the mean estimate of probability between the four groups, as
assessed with either independent two-tailed t-tests or one-
way ANOVA assessments (signiﬁcance deﬁned as P<. 05).
Despite the wide spread of estimates within each group,
all four groups produced an identical median estimate
probability of 10%. It is of interest that the median estimate
of these groups is close to the Bayesian result, whereas the
mean results are approximately four times higher. There is
no evidence of correlation between experience in making
diagnoses (consultants compared with trainees and medical
students) and the accuracy of their estimates.
The distribution of responses within the groups was
distinctly non-Gaussian. Figure 1 shows the distribution of
responses within the group of consultant pathologists. There
appears to be a bimodal distribution, with most of the
respondents towards the left of the chart (estimated proba-
bility of 0–29.9%), but with a second peak in the 90–100%
category. The distribution also failed to follow a Gaussian
pattern in the other groups (data not shown).
The question itself, whether due to the presentation or
the content, appeared to be oﬀ-putting to some respondents,
and it is acknowledged that the explicit description of
the probability of a diagnosis is rare in routine diagnostic
practice.Only52%oftheconsultantpathologists,74%ofthe
trainee pathologists, and 70% of the nonpathologist medical
doctors who undertook the survey provided an answer for
the particular question described in this report.
4.Conclusion
Despite the limitations of this study, the data would suggest
that base-rate error is a potential source of diagnostic error
for cellular pathologists. When deciding whether to order
and how to interpret the results of an immunocytochemical
test, it is very rare to have clear data on the pretest
probabilities of a disease in the relevant population and
the rate and pattern of positivity in the diseases relevant
to the diﬀerential diagnosis. The published literature is
often contradictory regarding the rates of positivity for
stains indiﬀerenttumours,with subjectivefactors(including
personal thresholds for the interpretation of positivity) and
local factors (e.g., variations in ﬁxation, pre-treatment, or
antibody clones used) making extrapolation from published
literature even more challenging. Inevitably, the interpreta-
tion of the diagnostic signiﬁcance of the test results depends
on the subjective impression ofthe pathologistin the context
of the clinical information and morphological ﬁndings.
The data presented here demonstrate that, at least in the
admittedlyartiﬁcialsettingofatext-basedcasescenario,con-
sultant and trainee pathologists show enormous variation in
their interpretation of the diagnostic signiﬁcance of an unex-
pected immunohistochemical result. I am using the term
“diagnostic signiﬁcance” in this contextto refer to the weight
placedby thepathologist onthe ﬁnding in the determination
of their diagnosis and “unexpected result” in this context to
refer to a test result that is positive in a higher proportion
o fc a s e so fa na l t e r n a t i v ed i a g n o s i st h a ni nt h ed i a g n o s i s
considered most likely before the test was performed.4 Pathology Research International
Previous data regarding the interpretation of unexpected
test results in other contexts [1–4] has demonstrated a ten-
dency of doctors to overinterpret the diagnostic signiﬁcance
of the unexpected result. This was demonstrated by some
of the respondents to this survey. For example, 38% of the
consultantcellularpathologistsgaveanestimatedprobability
of double or more the mathematically correct answer, and
30% of consultant pathologists and 32% of trainees gave
a response of ﬁve times or more higher. If this can be ex-
trapolated to routine diagnostic practice, this would suggest
thatapproximatelyonethirdofcellularpathologistssubstan-
tially overestimate the diagnostic signiﬁcance of unexpected
immunohistochemical staining results.
In contrast, 33% of consultant cellular pathologists and
39% of the trainees gave an estimated probability of half
or less of the mathematically correct ﬁgure. Again, if this
can be extrapolated to routine practice, this would suggest
that approximately one third of pathologists underestimate
the diagnostic signiﬁcance of an unexpected immunohisto-
chemical result. The distribution range of the answers, with
clusters of inappropriately high estimates, would suggest
that there may be common cognitive mistakes made in the
assessment of disease probability by all groups surveyed.
Although the ﬁnding that approximately one third of
pathologists underestimated the diagnostic signiﬁcance of
the result, one third overestimated, and another third were
reasonably close might not appear to be overly concerning,
the range of individual estimates could be considered to be.
The ﬁnding that positive staining with an antibody more
frequently found in tumour B than tumour A altered the
estimatedprobabilityoftumourBfrom1%tobetween0and
100% by diﬀerent individual consultant cellular pathologists
may be of concern.
Gigerenzer et al. has extensively examined how altering
the presentation of probability data in both professional
and general public settings can improve the interpretation
of statistical information [5, 6]. He consistently found that
predictions were improved by presenting information as
“natural frequencies” rather than percentage probabilities.
For example, in the context of this study, the data could have
been presented in a natural frequency format as “an experi-
enced histopathologist after examining a haematoxylin- and
eosin-stained slide and taking into account the clinical and
radiological context ofthe patient considersthat, out of1000
patients with a similar slide, 990 will have tumour A and 10
will have tumour B. Antibody X is positive in 80% of cases
of tumour B; therefore, it is likely that, of these 10 patients
with tumour B, 8 will stain positively. On the other hand,
of the 990 patients with tumour A, 99 would be expected to
stain for antibody X. If the tumour stains for antibody X,
how likely is it that the patient will have tumour B?”. Such
a presentation was not used in this study, but, in the light
of Gigerenzer et al.’s ﬁndings in similar scenarios presented
to doctors, it is likely that such a presentation would have
improved understanding.
It couldbe argued thatpresenting the information in this
study in the way that was chosen could have been designed
to be misleading, however pathologists rarely have access to
information regarding the stains they routinely use that is
presented in terms of natural frequencies. Natural frequency
presentation takes away some of the cognitive load in such
a calculation, by presenting data that is not reliant on the
base rate of the condition in the relevant population. Unfor-
tunately, in routine practice, it is at best extremely rare to
have a clear indication of the probability of a disease in the
relevant population. In the example given, the base rate of
relevance is the population of patients who the pathologist
would consider to have a similar haematoxylin- and eosin-
stained slide. This will to some extent depend on the
frequency of the diﬀerential diagnosis in the pathologist’s
referral population, but will also be dependent on the
pathologist’sownexperience,ability,andbiases.Itishowever
vital for pathologists when interpreting studies describing
the alleged sensitivity and speciﬁcity of stains to consider
whether the population assessed is relevant to their own
practice. For example, a study comparing the value of a
stainindiscriminating betweenacertaintumourandnormal
tissue may suggest greater sensitivity and speciﬁcity than a
study comparing its value in discriminating between two
morphologically similar but clinically distinct tumours.
It appears from the ﬁndings in this study that pathol-
ogists are not all immune from base-rate errors and that
increasing diagnostic experience does not reduce the risk of
such errors. The importance of the base-rate probability of
a disease on the interpretation of an unexpected immuno-
histochemical ﬁnding is underappreciated by many patholo-
gists. This is a source of potential diagnostic error, and it is
suggestedthatthetrainees are madeaware ofbase-rate errors
in their training programmes.
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